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CONSTITUTIONAL
-DEPRIVATION

LAW-FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT-DUE

PROCESS

OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-CIVIL COMMITMENT-The

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that a juvenile is entitled to procedural due process
protection, including a probable cause hearing and a post-commitment hearing, when his parents commit him to an institution.
Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. May 16, 1977).
Plaintiffs, juveniles' who had been committed under voluntary2

admission or voluntary commitment provisions of the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, 3 brought a class action'

to have these provisions declared unconstitutional and to enjoin
their enforcement. The plaintiffs contended that by following the
statutory provisions, state officials 5 violated their due process and

equal protections rights under the fourteenth amendment because
1. Plaintiffs, who were children 18 years old or younger, alleged constitutional deprivations under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.
Supp. 1039, 1042 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. May 16,
1977).
2. An admission of a minor is considered voluntary since the legislature has given his
parent the legal right to act in the minor's behalf. AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAw 19 (S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK eds., rev. ed. 1971). One commentator,
however, has defined involuntary hospitalization as the "removal of a person judged to be
mentally ill from normal surroundings to a hospital authorized to detain him." Id. at 35.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-704 (1966). The challenged sections were id. H4 440203. Section 4402 provides that application for a voluntary admission may be made by any
person over 18, or by the parent or guardian of a younger individual. Upon application to the
director of the facility, an independent examination is made and the individual is admitted
if care is needed. Those individuals age 18 or older may withdraw from the institution freely,
whereas only the adult applicant requesting the admission of a younger individual may
request his withdrawal. Section 4403 provides for a 30-day commitment if temporary care is
deemed warranted. Under this section, a procedure is available should an individual desire
to leave the facility following his commitment. See 402 F. Supp. at 1041-42 n.2.
4. Federal jurisdiction in this civil action was sought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3)
(1970). 402 F. Supp. at 1041-42. Plaintiffs' counsel was appointed guardian ad litem since
the class could not sue in its own behalf in federal court under FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c). See 2
NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER, LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE "VOLUNTARY" ADMISSION OF CHILDREN TO MENTAL INSTITUTIONS 6 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL CHALLENGESI.
5. Defendants included the hospital director of Haverford State Hospital, the Secretary
of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Deputy Secretary for Mental Health and Mental Retardation of the Department of Welfare. 402 F. Supp. at 1044.
6. The court said it had no occasion to address the arguments aimed at disparate treatment of adults and children under the statutory provisions since no plaintiff had alleged any
attempt to voluntarily commit himself. Thus, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 15: 337

the procedures did not adequately guard against the erroneous commitment of children who are not mentally ill.' Subsequent to the
filing of the action, the Department of Public Welfare adopted regulations providing for additional procedural protections.' The plaintiffs argued that the Pennsylvania statute and its attendant regulations were still deficient since they did not provide for a precommitment hearing or specify a time in which a post-commitment
hearing should be held?
A divided three-judge district court declared the challenged
provisions unconstitutional.'" The court asserted that a juvenile's
interest in avoiding an erroneous deprivation of liberty was protected by the fourteenth amendment." While it found that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to a pre-commitment hearing'" or trial
standing to argue that the statute did not afford children equal protection although those over
18 could voluntarily commit themselves while those younger could not. Id. at 1054 n.27.
7. Plaintiffs had compiled data detailing the reasons for confinement of Pennsylvania
residents. See LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 4, at 247A-73A. The court relied on this data
and a summary of 10 commitment cases provided by the defendants. 402 F. Supp. at 104344. Reasons offered for commitment included: drug overdose by the child; participation in a
gas station robbery; arson; deteriorating health of other family members, often the mother;
opportunity for the rest of the family to vacation; difficulties between the mother and child;
and fear that another child would be led to an early marriage to escape the troublesome
family situation. Id. See also note 28 infra.
8. 402 F. Supp. at 1042-43 nn. 5 & 6. The regulations required referral from a community
mental health unit before a juvenile could be admitted to a mental health facility. Retarded
juveniles could be referred by a physician or psychologist. Juveniles ages 13 to 18, admitted
following an independent examination by the institution, had to be given written notice
informing them of their right to call an attorney. If the juvenile objected to hospitalization,
the facility had 48 hours to discharge him or to institute an involuntary commitment proceeding under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406 (1966). See 3 PA. BuLL. 1840 (1973) for the text of
the regulations.
9. 402 F. Supp. at 1042. The regulations did not allow children under 13 to question their
confinement. See notes 3 & 8 supra.
10. 402 F. Supp. at 1053-54. Since the enforcement of a state statute was challenged, a
three-judge district court was convened pursuant to.28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed and
reenacted in part, Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified at 28
U.S.C.A. § 2284 (Supp. 1977))). Pending its appeal, the state applied to the district court
for a stay which was denied. It then appealed to Justice Brennan, sitting as Circuit Justice,
who again denied the stay. The state resubmitted its request to Justice Rehnquist, who
offered the matter for review by the entire Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
telegrammed the United States Supreme Court that full implementation of Bartley, requiring
the release and recommitment of all juveniles presently confined, would overwhelm the state
courts. On December 15, 1975, the Supreme Court, without explanation, granted a stay.
LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 4, at 16.
11. 402 F. Supp. at 1046-47.
12. Id. at 1049. In Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated
and remandedon other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), a state procedure permitting emergency
detention after an ex parte hearing, without providing for procedural safeguards shortly
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by jury, the court determined that a child has a right to be present
at a hearing conducted shortly after his admission,' to retain counsel, to offer testimony, and to cross-examine witnesses in order to
challenge his commitment. 5 Balancing the state's interests in protecting the child and maintaining the family unit with that of the
individual child's "liberty," the Bartley court ordered that all children admitted for commitment receive notice of a probable cause
hearing to be held within 72 hours, followed by a post-commitment
hearing within two weeks. 6
thereafter, was held to be constitutionally defective. Lessard suggests that an argument could
be made for not allowing a significant deprivation of liberty without a prior hearing. Bartley,
however, denied a pre-commitment hearing in order that parents would not be unreasonably
deterred from institutionalizing a child who may endanger his own safety or the safety of the
community. 402 F. Supp. at 1049. Recently, the Supreme Court held that a state cannot
institutionalize a nondangerous person who can live outside an institution by himself or with
the assistance of others. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See also Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (interpreting statute authorizing detention as requiring an
individual to be dangerous); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (potential for harming
oneself or others has to be great enough to justify massive curtailment of liberty); Dixon v.
Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (finding of present threat of serious physical
harm to individual or others required before commitment).
13. 402 F. Supp. at 1051. Accord, McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971)
(jury trial unnecessary in delinquency proceeding). But see Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
378, 394-95 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (adult emergency detention and ex parte involuntary commitment provisions held unconstitutional). Lynch determined a jury trial to be desirable before
a civil commitment because of the social and legal judgments which are involved in the
decision to commit an individual.
14. An individual's presence at his hearing could be waived by him or by his counsel if
the individual is so ill he cannot attend. 402 F. Supp. at 1051.
15. The court felt that the impact of an adversarial proceeding was insignificant when
compared to the trauma of erroneous commitment. 402 F. Supp. at 1050-53. The right to
counsel in delinquency and commitment proceedings is commonly recognized. See In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076 (1st Cir. 1973) (counsel must be
afforded before day of final commitment); In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(counsel necessary at a hearing following emergency commitment); Heryford v. Parker, 396
F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968) (counsel afforded in the commitment of a retarded child); Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (right to counsel in emergency and involuntary
detentions); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (counsel afforded in
involuntary commitment).
The right to offer evidence in one's behalf is also commonly recognized. See Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (petitioner convicted of indecedent liberties under criminal
statute, but sentenced under a different statute without notice or full hearing, has a right to
offer evidence); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile in a delinquency hearing may offer
evidence in his behalf).
16. 402 F. Supp. at 1049. See also Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(probable cause hearing within 7 days); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) (probable cause hearing within 48 hours).
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The Bartley court first acknowledged that due process requires
that a state provide substantial procedural safeguards before it curtails the liberty of an individual either for benevolent or punitive
reasons. 7 It rejected the defendants' argument that substantial due
process safeguards are not required in a civil procedure"8 where the
state, acting as parens patriae, is undertaking treatment of a juvenile."9 According to the majority, the defendants' attempt to label
the proceeding "civil" failed to take account of the child's involuntary removal from his home, and ignored the social stigma which
often accompanies civil commitment because society misunderstands mental illness and views it with fear and disdain. 0 The court
concluded that a child is clearly entitled to some procedural protection from the possibility of an erroneous denial of his liberty for an
indeterminate time through involuntary confinement. 2'
''
The district court next addressed the "difficult and unique"
issue of whether parents could waive their child's constitutional
rights by deciding for the child that commitment was necessary.
Waiver presented the problem of reconciling a child's right to procedural protection with a parent's consistently recognized authority to
rear his child. 3 The court acknowledged that Ginsberg v. New
York 2 ' and Wisconsin v. Yoder25 affirmed the traditional concept of
parental authority. In the more recent case, Yoder, the Supreme
17. 402 F. Supp. at 1045-46.
18. This argument is frequently raised and rejected in delinquency and commitment
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (adult commitment proceeding).
19. Parenspatriaeis one justification for state laws which protect the well-being of members of the community by establishing guardianships protecting minors and detaining mentally ill persons. For a discussion of parens patriae in the context of civil commitment see
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARv. L. Rav. 1190,
1207-22 (1974).
20. 402 F. Supp. at 1046. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973). While
his commitment stands on the record, an individual is denied the right to -vote, the right to
serve on a federal jury, access to a driver's license, and access to a gun license; he is also
presumed incompetent. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343
F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (retarded children sought education and training in public
schools); Hearings on the ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on
ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1
(1969-70); K. DONALDSON, INSANrrY INSIDE OUT (1976).
21. 402 F. Supp. at 1048.
22. Id. at 1047.
23. Id.
24. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
25. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See 402 F. Supp. at 1047.
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Court had acknowledged the primary role of parents in a child's
upbringing when it held compulsory education beyond eighth grade
interfered with the free exercise of the Amish religion. The Supreme
Court had expressly stated, however, that it was not considering the
problem of competing religious interests of parent and child since
it was not in issue."6 The Bartley majority, however, regarded the
commitment of a child as presenting a conflict of interests between
the child and his parent. 7 It recognized that a parent's decision to
commit a child may be based on parental desire to avoid the responsibility of caring for a difficult child or a parent's inability to cope
with complex family problems, rather than on the child's mental
illness. Therefore, the court was unwilling to permit parental waiver
of the child's constitutional rights absent evidence that the child's
best interests had been fully considered. 8
In a detailed dissent, Judge Broderick stated that the court improperly balanced the interests of the child against the traditional
state interest in preserving family integrity. In his view, the statutory procedures generally provided sufficient protection against
26. 406 U.S. at 230.
27. The court recognized this direct conflict as one aspect of Bartley that set it apart from
other cases. 402 F. Supp. at 1047-48, citing New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc.
v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (conflict in interests arises when a
parent does not want to care for an abnormal child). Expert witnesses testifying before the
court pointed out that juveniles committed to institutions often come from homes torn by
discord and disruption. See LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 4, at 140A, 237. See also Saville
v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430, 432 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (requiring extensive procedural safeguards in view of the possible conflict of interest between mentally retarded child and parent); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Neb. 1973) (recognizing the possibility that
parents' desires concerning treatment may conflict with childrens' interests). See generallv
Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some CriticalIssues, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
133, 136-43 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Murdock], which discusses the problems of guardianship and conflict of interest between a parent and a retarded child.
28. 402 F. Supp. at 1047, citing Kent v. United States, 401 F.2d 408, 416 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Burger, J., dissenting). See Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of
Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 840, 851 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ellis],
citing B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 38 (1973). Ennis and Siegel
describe the troubled reaction of some parents to the emergence in recent years of a counterlifestyle among young people, and thereby lend support to the suggestion that parents might
commit their children when they disapprove of their behavior. See Murdock, supra note 27,
at 139. Some parental motives for institutionalizing retarded children offered by Murodck
include: interest in well-being of other children; mental and physical frustration at home;
economic strain; and advice of doctors who are unaware of other possibilities. Institutionalizing a child may also provide an outlet for tensions at home caused by a breakdown in
family relationships. Szasz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally I1, 9 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 399,
414 (1960).
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wrongful commitment while they permitted a parent to seek necessary treatment for a sick child. Requiring all commitments to turn
on an adversary proceeding would increase the trauma of institutionalization without affording any further significant protection for
2
the child. 1
Bartley extends the safeguards of procedural due process previously recognized in criminal cases, adult civil commitment cases,
and juvenile delinquency proceedings to children facing civil commitment. Only within the last ten years has the Supreme Court
granted procedural due process guarantees to civilly committed
adults.3 0 Although most of these commitment cases have arisen in
the criminal context, their rationale provides support for safeguards
in civil commitment proceedings to insure that the nature and duration of the commitment bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the commitment. Moreover, due process protections have
been afforded to children in the context of juvenile delinquency
proceedings .3 In re Gault,32 the seminal Supreme Court decision
29. 402 F. Supp. at 1054-58 (dissenting opinion). Accord, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376
(1970) (Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., dissenting) (juvenile court system needs flexibility in order
to survive).
30. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state cannot confine nondangerous
individual who can survive with supportive help); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,
407 U.S. 245 (1972) (indefinite confinement cannot rest on procedures designed to authorize
a brief observation); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (indefinite confinement due to
lack of capacity to stand trial violates due process); Humphrey y. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972)
(there must be procedure for commitment and commitment renewal following conviction for
violation of Sex Crimes Act); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (violation of criminal
statute with sentencing under Sex Offenders Act without notice or full hearing violates due
process); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (jury review available to those civilly
committed also extends to civil commitment following a prison term).
Safeguards have also been granted by lower federal courts to individuals civilly committed.
E.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (standard for commitment is beyond a
reasonable doubt); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (notice, probable cause
hearing, and final hearing within 21 days required); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.
Ala. 1974) (notice, probable cause hearing within 7 days, right to counsel, and final hearing
required within 21 days); Bell v. Wayne County, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (notice,
prompt preliminary hearing, counsel and jury trial required); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (right to counsel and full hearing within 2 weeks after commitment required); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (hearing, counsel,
right to offer evidence, confrontation and cross-examination permitted).
31. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)
(waiver of jurisdiction over proceeding by juvenile court to criminal court without "full
investigation," including hearing, access to records, and statement of reasons for court's
decision, is invalid); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (confession of 15 year-old, obtained
by using methods violating his due process, is inadmissible). Cf. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d
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regarding the rights of children, declared that the hearing in a delinquency proceeding must meet the essentials of due process, including notice, the right to counsel, and the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses. 3 Gault expressly rejected calling the juvenile
proceeding "civil" in order to obviate the need for criminal due

process safeguards .3
Prior to Bartley, other lower federal courts had extended procedural safeguards to mentally ill and mentally retarded minors facing commitment. 3 In Heryford v. Parker,36 the Tenth Circuit
adopted Gault's reasoning that incarceration itself demands observance of constitutional safeguards when it held that a child committed to a training school for the feebleminded and epileptic was entitled to due process protection. In Saville v. Teadway,37 which also
determined that procedural safeguards should precede a loss of liberty, the federal district court mandated the establishment of an
admissions review board to give notice and advice to proposed residents and to provide further testing or evaluation prior to commitment when requested by the candidate. The Bartley court found the
reasoning supporting the decisions in these commitment and delinquency cases to be persuasive. It was unwilling to accept the argument that since the child is receiving treatment for his illness at the
request of a parent, his liberty need not be protected. Instead, it
focused on the possibility of erroneous commitment ensuing from
strain and frustration within the home, and the potentially harmful
38
effects on the youth of an unwarranted commitment.
That some protections should exist to insulate a child from erro393 (10th Cir. 1968) (Gault due process requirements extended to commitment of feebleminded child).
32. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. Id. at 31-57.
34. Id. at 17.
35. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Kidd v. Schmidt, 399 F.
Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Tenn. 1974).
36. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
37. 404 F. Supp. 430, 439 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). The district court fashioned safeguards for
the commitment of retarded juveniles including admission only in accordance with orders and
adjudication by a court; consent of "mildly retarded" or. "borderline" juveniles 16 years or
older; signed consent of juveniles older than 16 who have capacity to understand the proceeding; representation at the hearing by counsel or Citizens Advocacy Council; candidate's
access to documents; and right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. Id. at
437-39.
38. See notes 7 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
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neous commitment to an institution may seem self-evident. Traditionally, parents have had the right, however, to make decisions
concerning their child's welfare without state interference.3 9 In
Meyer v. Nebraska," the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language before the ninth grade
since, among other things, it infringed on parental freedom to educate their children. In a subsequent decision, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,4 the Court ruled that a state law requiring all children to
attend public school constituted an unreasonable interference with
the liberty of a parent to direct the upbringing of his child. Yoder
further emphasized that the primary role of parents in child-rearing
has been established as an enduring American tradition." Significantly, in these cases the Supreme Court considered the interests
of child and parent as allied; situations where their interests might
conflict were not squarely confronted. 3 Conceivably, the concept of
parental authority which has been articulated by the Supreme
Court could apply to decisions involving medical treatment of children, including the decision to institutionalize a mentally ill child."
Bartley, however, explicitly recognized that the interests of parents
and children need not be allied, particularly where the child objected to his institu tionalization. 5 The decision, therefore, may represent an enlightened view, since it recognized that disparate interests of parent and child may be involved in juvenile commitments
and announced that the state was obligated to establish reasonable
39. See generally Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justificationand Limitations,
26 STAN. L. REv. 1383 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State Intrusion], which discusses the
origins of parental liberty within the concept of "natural rights."
40. 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
41. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
42. Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
43. But see id. at 241-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (mature child should be able to express
a conflicting interest, and not seeking out his views would be an invasion of his rights). Justice
Douglas stated: "We have in the past analyzed similar conflicts between parent and State
with little regard for the views of the child." Id. at 243 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, at issue was the fundamental right
of students' free speech. School children wore armbands to protest the war in Vietnam. The
Supreme Court, recognizing the state's obligation to protect the rights of children as well as
adults, held that a student's right of expression does not disappear at the school door, although the right existed only as long as the students were not disruptive.
44. Guidelines to accommodate the opposing interests of children and parents when the
state intervenes in behalf of the child are offered in State Intrusion, supra note 39, at 1392401.
45. 402 F. Supp. at 1047-48.
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safeguards to prevent the child's interests from being ignored in the
process.
Once it recognized that the interests of parent and child may not
be coextensive in a commitment proceeding, the court was presented with a difficult task of fashioning a remedy that would substantially preserve the traditional authority of parents, while it protected those children whose parents may not act in their best interests. Although it is questionable whether the Pennsylvania statute
and regulations under which plaintiffs were committed did afford
sufficient safeguards against unwarranted commitment, the grim
picture of mistaken commitments which plaintiffs presented to the
court may have persuaded it to conclude that the statute and regulations were procedurally defective without an adequate evaluation
of the existing safeguards." Moreover, whereas the court recognized
precedent supporting parental authority, it appeared to raise the
plaintiffs' interests above traditional authority because of the potentially grievous harm resulting from erroneous commitment.
Although the court's concern for a child's well-being where commitment may be wrongfully requested is commendable, the decision
would have been more persuasive had the court more critically considered the evolving concept of parental authority itself. Indeed,
cases recognizing parental authority provide room for argument that
the interests of children in certain circumstances should be protected over the authority of their parents. Meyer and Pierce, cases
frequently relied upon for their rejection of state interference with
parental authority, were concerned with the education of children,
an area where conflict between the interests of parent and child
arguably may not be too inimical to the child's well-being, or destructive of his individual rights, if resolved in favor of the parent.
47 a later Supreme Court case upholding
Prince v. Massachusetts,
state regulation of child labor, limited the possible breadth of
Pierce" by upholding the state's interest in protecting a child's
46. The opinion details the reasons these juveniles were committed. The court heard
testimony from nine psychiatrists; yet, it focused only on the reasons the individuals were
institutionalized, ignoring the testimony of expert witnesses and neglecting to evaluate the
statutory provisions. See notes 3 & 8 supra. The majority opinon gives no specific explanation
as to why the Bartley court rejected the statute. Perhaps the questionable basis upon which
some of the commitments were founded overly influenced the court. For the dissenter's
evaluation of the statutory procedures see 402 F. Supp. at 1054-58 (Broderick, J., dissenting).
47. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
48. Id. at 166.
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health and welfare over parental autonomy. The broad scope of
parental authority established in Meyer was also somewhat limited
by Ginsberg. There, the Supreme Court distinguished the learning
of a foreign language in Meyer, which it found not to be harmful to
the child's well-being49 and thus not warranting state protection,
from the access to obscene literature, which it found to be potentially harmful to the child. The GinsbergCourt approved state regulation of the sale of obscene materials to minors as a necessary state
intrusion for the protection of a child's welfare. 5 More recently,
Yoder acknowledged that parental authority can be circumscribed
if the health or safety of a child will be jeopardized, or if a parent's
decision has the potential effect of imposing significant "social burdens."'5 In short, these Supreme Court decisions suggest that while
the state has a strong interest in fostering the concept of parental
authority and intrudes on parental control with reluctance," it has
a significant interest in protecting the child whose mental or physical health may be seriously endangered by his parents' decisions.53
The Bartley court recognized that erroneous commitment creates
49. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968).
50. Id. at 639-43.
51. See 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
52. See Ellis, supra note 28, at 854-55, where the author examines the traditional, noninterventionist policy of the state in family decisions, including the requirement of parental
consent for medical treatment of a minor and the parental tort immunity doctrine.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976), the state's support of parental
authority was in direct conflict with the interest of a minor seeking an abortion against the
wishes of her family. After reviewing Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, and recognizing the need to
protect parental authority from unwarranted state interference, the Supreme Court found the
family unit would not be strengthened by overriding the decision of the minor in favor of
parental discretion. Id. at 2844. The significant interest of the minor recognized in Danforth
was the right to privacy. Like the Bartley plaintiffs' interest in freedom from unwarranted
curtailment of liberty, in Danforth the minor's right of privacy was held to be protected by
the fourteenth amendment. Deemphasizing the constitutional rights of the minors in either
case would not have furthered the state's interest in enhancing the family. Indeed, in
Danforth the Supreme Court determined that the minor's interest in her privacy is at least
as worthy of protection as the parents' interest in the termination of the child's pregnancy.
Id.
53. See In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1972) (counsel should be
granted to minor in incorrigibility proceeding to enable him to show that family breakdown
was caused by parent's problems rather than by child's behavior). See also People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 I1. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (child
provided with transfusion against religious wishes of parents); Marsden v. Commonwealth,
352 Mass. 564, 227 N.E.2d 1 (1967) (parent and wayward child afforded separate counsel);
Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E.2d 419 (1947) (excessive punishment may
render parent or one in loco parentis criminally liable).

1976-77

Recent Decisions

social problems and may be injurious to the development of the
juvenile. Thus, consistent with Supreme Court decisions, it determined that limitations on parental authority are appropriate where
a child may be detained indefinitely.
The Bartley decision must be viewed not only as extending constitutional rights to juveniles, but also as a judicial recognition and
strong response to the abuse and tragedy which present commitment procedures may permit. That this recognition warranted the
striking down of Pennsylvania commitment statutes and regulations, however, is questionable. The existing procedures afforded
sufficient protection to many juveniles, while they permitted parents who have carefully considered what is best for their children
to institutionalize them without administrative delay. Indeed, what
procedures are necessary when parents have clearly acted in the best
interests of their children and who will make that determination
were questions left unanswered by the court in Bartley. The Supreme Court has heard the arguments in this case on appeal." The
adequacy of the existing Pennsylvania procedures in protecting
the interests of plaintiffs while allowing parents to exercise control
over their children may well be an issue on which the two courts
disagree.5
Zelda Curtiss
54. See 45 U.S.L.W. 3405-07 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976).
55. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court refused to rule on the merits and vacated and
remanded the case to the district court to redefine the class of plaintiffs. 45 U.S.L.W. 4451
(U.S. May 16, 1977). The Court concluded that the claims of the named plaintiffs, mentally
ill individuals between 15 and 18 years old, were mooted by the Mental Health Procedures
Act of 1976 which allowed juveniles between 14 and 18 to voluntarily admit themselves or
withdraw upon written notice. In addition, the Court found the remaining plaintiffs, mentally
retarded youths of all ages and mentally ill children 13 years and younger, had "live" claims,
but the mootness of named plaintiffs' claims fragmented the subclasses so as to no longer be
a properly certified class under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 45 U.S.L.W. at 4453-55.

